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"QUAFFABLE, BUT FAR FROM TRANSCENDENT" 1 :
MARYLAND'S TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PROHIBITION
"Anyone who has held a bottle of Grange
Hennitage in one hand and a broken corkscrew in
the other knows this to be a palpable injury."
-Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson

I.

2

INTRODUCTION

It's happened to every wine aficionado, both casual and serious,
in Maryland-she sits at her computer trying to locate on the
Internet the balanced Pinot Noir she enjoyed at a restaurant the
previous evening; locates the vineyard's website; clicks "purchase
now;" and, suddenly, her purchase is brought to a surprising halt.
Maryland consumers cannot legally purchase wine on the Internet,
eliminating from their purchase thousands of varietals
manufactured by small wineries, not carried in retail stores. 3
Maryland's Byzantine liquor laws, the products of 1930's postProhibition legislation, do not pennit direct shipment of wines to
Maryland consumers. 4
Following Prohibition and the adoption of the Twenty-first
Amendment, most states adopted a similar statutory scheme to
effectuate tax collection and to regain control over liquor from
organized crime. 5 The statutes consisted of a three-tiered system,
dominated by wholesale distributors. 6
The result is that
wholesalers detennine what wines will be offered for sale in retail
stores. 7 Further, it is economically logical that wholesalers choose
wineries with a larger production over smaller wineries. 8
Smaller wineries, therefore, have turned to alternative markets
such as the Internet to sell their wines. 9 Ironically, it is the same
statutory scheme that drives smaller wineries into the direct
shipment market that forbids them from partaking in it-

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

SIDEWAYS (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2004); see Internet Movie Database,
Memorable Quotes from Sideways (2004), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0375063
Iquotes ("Quaffable, but uh ... far from transcendent.").
227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000).
See infra Part II(C).
See infra Parts 1I(8)-(C).
See infra Part 11(8)(1) .
See infra Part II(A)(I).
See infra Part II(A)(3).
Larger wineries, due to mass production, have more bottles available, larger
advertising budgets, and lower prices, giving them a better chance of survival in
the marketplace. See infra Part II(A)(3).
See infra Part II(A)(4).
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approximately half of all states forbid the direct shipment of wine
to consumers. 10
This conflict, the so-called "Wine Wars," II has ushered several
industry members into litigation. The Supreme Court, in its 2005
term, decided that states permitting direct shipment for in-state
wineries, but forbidding it for out-of-state wineries, violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause and are not justified by the Twentyfirst Amendment. 12
Following this decision, the Maryland Comptroller's initial
review of Maryland's direct shipment laws determined that the
statutes passed constitutional muster. 13 However, a lawsuit filed in
the United States District Court of Maryland at the end of 2005
raises several legal issues that call the regulations into question. 14
Specifically, Maryland law permits local wineries to circumvent
the three-tiered system by selling their wines to restaurants and
retailers, while not permitting out-of-state wineries selling more
than 27,500 gallons a year to do the same. 15
This Comment first examines the history and development of
direct shipment laws following Prohibition. 16 Next, it assesses
their validity under the Dormant Commerce Clause and determines
whether they are saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. 17
This Comment posits that Maryland's direct shipment laws are
an antiquated result of post-Prohibition legislation, causing a
detrimental impact to interstate commerce, and, therefore, violate
the Dormant Commerce Clause. 18 Justifications permitted by the
Twenty-first Amendment, such as promotion of temperance, tax
collection, and prevention of sales to minors, do not justify the
direct shipment laws. 19
As such, Maryland's laws
unconstitutionally restrict the consumer and the out-of-state wine
producer. 20

10.
II.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra Part Il(A).
"Wine Wars" refers to the conflict of interests between boutique wineries, the
wholesale and retail lobby, state legislators, and the courts. See Lisa Lucas,
Comment, A New Approach to the Wine Wars: Reconciling the Twenty-First
Amendment with the Commerce Clause, 52 UCLA L. REv. 899 (2005).
See infra Part II(A)(5).
Michael Dresser, Maryland Wineries Are Told to Halt Direct Sales, BALT. SUN,
Feb. 8,2006, at IA.
See infra Part II(C)(3).
See infra Part II(C)(3).
See infra Parts II(A)-(B).
See infra Part III.
See infra Parts III(A)-(C).
See infra Part III(D).
See infra Part III.
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Direct Shipment Bans
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"Here's to the corkscrew-a useful key to unlock
the storehouse of wit, the treasury of laughter, the
front door of fellowship, and the gate of pleasant
folly."
-W.E.P. French

1.

21

Structure of Three-Tiered Distribution Schemes

Most states in the U.S. distribute wine and other alcoholic
beverages through a three-tiered distribution system, a by-product
of the post-Prohibition legislative flurry where states attempted to
reign-in and maintain rigid control over alcohol sales. 22 The first
tier in the system requires a wine producer to obtain a permit from
the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau in order to sell
wine. 23 Next, the producer may sell wine to a licensed wholesaler,
responsible for paying applicable taxes. 24 Finally, the wholesaler
delivers wine to the licensed retailer, who may sell to the
consumer, and collects sales taxes. 25 Direct shipment laws, which
prevent an out-of-state retailer from selling liquor directly to the
consumer, are integral to maintaining centralized control over
alcohol sales. 26
The three-tiered system developed after the ratification of the
Twenty-first Amendment in order to advance a number of the
states' goals in regulating alcohol. 27 First, the top-level tier
consisting of the wholesaler was intended to promote efficient
collection of taxes and prevent sales to minors. 28 Second, by
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

From the wine list of Commander's Palace in New Orleans, LA, courtesy ofJohn
McDonald. Dallas, TX, available at The Wrath of Grapes, Quotable Quotes,
http://www.wrathofgrapes.comlwinequot.html(last visited Mar. 24, 2007).
Federal Trade Commission, Possible Anti-Competitive Barriers to E-Commerce:
Wine 5-6 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf.
Id. at 5.
Id.
/d.
See Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 679-80 (So. D. Tex. 2002).
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 6.
Id. According to the Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America ("WSW An):

Part of the reason that the three-tiered system works so well is
that the federal government, through the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act, and the states through related laws, require that
there be an intermediary between the supplier and retail tiers
designed to ensure that large suppliers with market power do not
dominate individual retailers to the exclusion of other suppliers who
might try to break into the market. In other words, the wholesale tier
actually serves to blunt monopolistic supplier tendencies that had
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gammg control of alcohol distribution, states hoped to wrestle
control of alcohol sales from the tight hold that organized crime
gained du:ring Prohibition. 29 Third, some states may have intended
to keep alcohol prices unnecessarily high to promote temperance. 30
2.

Direct Shipment Bans

"Direct shipping refers to wineries or retailers shipping wine
directly to consumers outside the three-tiered system, usually to
their home or work via a package delivery company such as FedEx
[Corporation] (,FedEx') or United Parcel Service of America, Inc.
('UPS,).,,3) Most states have banned direct shipment of all
alcoholic beverages, including wine, in order to maintain
centralized state control over liquor sales through the three-tiered
Approximately twenty-four states permit direct
system. 32
shipment of wine;33 thirteen of these states have reciprocity laws
permitting direct shipment from wineries outside the state if the

prevailed prior to Prohibition . . .. A supplier must obtain approval
for the label from the [Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau]
and state authorities to ensure that it contains truthful and nonmisleading information and mandatory health warnings. That bottle
must then be sold to a state and federally licensed wholesaler who is
responsible for maintaining records and filing detailed reports
tracking each bottle brought into the state, paying the excise taxes
due on the alcohol, and delivering the alcohol to a state licensed retail
establishment. The retailer is responsible for paying over to the state
the sales taxes generated by each sale, and is directly responsible for
ensuring that alcohol does not fall into the hands of minors or other
prohibited individuals. Since both the wholesaler and the retailer
must be licensed by the state, they are fully accountable for any
dereliction of their duties. They are subject to on-site inspections,
auditing and compliance checks, and any violation can result in the
loss of license, fines and other potentially more severe penalties.

29.

Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America, Position Paper 2 (Oct. 8, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/panel/gray.pdf.
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 6. According to the WSWA:
By channeling the physical distribution of beverage alcohol
through licensed in-state wholesalers and retailers, the state can
effectively enforce its sales and tax policies (including barring sales
to minors, protecting dry areas, limiting strength, controlling labels
and advertising and the like) because it can license, inspect, and hold
responsible these local firms.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Position Paper, supra note 28, at 2-3.
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 6.
ld. at 7.
See id.
ld. at 7; see Wine Institute, Who Ships Where, http://wi.shipcompliant.com/
WhoShipsWhere.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2007). States that permit shipment
include Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, D.C., and Wyoming. !d.
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"[s]tate of origin affords similar nondiscriminatory treatment.,,34
Most interstate direct shipments are prohibited in the remaining
twenty-six states. 35
3.

Dynamics of the Wholesale and Direct Shipping Markets

a.

Wholesalers' Interests

The Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America, Inc. ("WSWA")
represents 450 wholesaler companies in forty-two states; its
wholesalers distribute more than 90 percent of all wine and spirits
sold in the U.S. 36 Wholesale distributing is a multi-billion dollar
industry. 37 The wholesaler industry has successfully lobbied to
make direct shipping a felony.38 At least eight states have passed
felony legislation,39 including Maryland. 40
The number of licensed wholesalers has declined, "from several
thousand in the 1950s to a few hundred today.,,41 "The top five
wholesalers now account for a third of the total market.,,42 As the
wholesalers' market share increases, the industry can exert its
influence over suppliers for grice reductions while demanding
higher prices from retailers. 3 The wholesaler industry also
lobbies state and federal governments for protectionist state liauor
laws, which enable the wholesalers' domination of the market. 4

34.

35.

36.
37.

38.
39.
40.

41.
42.
43.
44.

Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 468 (2005). States that permit reciprocal
shipping include Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Wine Institute, Who Ships Where,
supra note 33.
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 8. States that prohibit shipment
include Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee and Utah. Wine Institute, Who Ships
Where, supra note 33.
Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America, Inc., About Us, http://www.wswa.org/
public/about/who.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
James Molnar, Comment, Under the Influence: Why Alcohol Direct Shipment
Laws Are a Violation o/the Commerce Clause, 9 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 169, 173
(2001).
!d.
Id.
See Wine Institute, Who Ships Where, supra note 33. Maryland officials cited the
difficulty in pursuing out-of-state violators on misdemeanor charges. Patrick
Thibodeau, State Liquor Law a Backlash Against Internet Merchants,
COMPUTER WORLD, Oct. 4, 1999, at 24.
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 8.
Molnar, supra note 37, at 173.
Id.
Id. at 173-74.
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The Direct Shipping Wine Market

The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") asserts that the number
of wineries has increased dramatically from 1975 to 2003: from
45
500-800 to well over 2,000.
Many of these new wineries are
small operations producing approximately 3,500 cases of wine
annually.46 While the number of small wineries has increased, the
number of available wholesalers has decreased. 47 This places
pressure on wholesalers to select wines with the best chance of
survival on the market: those with large marketing budgets and
large quantities of wines. 48 Smaller wineries do not produce
sufficient quantities of product to accommodate distributors. 49
Even if wholesalers distributed smaller wineries' products, the
additional cost of the wholesaler middleman would substantially
reduce the small wineries' profits. 50 Many industry experts,
including the FTC, have concluded that direct shipment could
substantially increase profits for smaller wineries through the
opening of additional markets, such as Internet sales. 51
4.

Direct Shipment Laws are a Barrier to Electronic Commerce

"The value of the direct sale of wine is estimated at $500
million with some estimates as high as $1 billion.,,52 A 2003 FTC
study determined that state laws banning interstate direct shipping
are the single largest impediment to expanded electronic commerce
in wine. 53 The FTC conducted a study in Virginia, a state that
banned direct shipping at the time of the study, to determine the
scope of wine availability and pricing issues. 54 Of the wines
surveyed, fifteen of the eighty-three wines were unavailable in the
searched Virginia outlet stores, while seventy-nine of the eightythree wines were available through online retail outlets. 55 The
study also found that a Virginia consumer could save money by

45.
46.
47.

48.
49.
50.

5l.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 8.
Molnar, supra note 37, at 174.
Kevin Atticks, Oh the Times, They Are a Changing, THE MARYLAND WINERIES,
http://www.marylandwine.comlmwallaws/deliverys.html.
ld.
Molnar, supra note 37, at 174.
ld. Boutique wineries produce a small supply, requiring that they sell their
product at a higher price. See id. The wholesaler markup would cut into this
profit margin, making a middleman less feasible. ld. However, large wineries
make their profit from selling in bulk, which is more conducive to a wholesaler
middleman relationship. See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 6.
See Atticks, supra note 47; Federal Trade Commission,supra note 22, at 14.
Molnar, supra note 37, at 173.
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 14.
ld. at 17-18.
ld. at 18.
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purchasing online; consumers could save an avera~e of $4.40 to
$7.19 per bottle for wines priced at $20.00 or more. 5
The FTC concluded:
[T]he quantitative findings likely understate the
impact of the direct shipment ban on variety. Since
the entire 83-bottle sample consisted of the more
popular wines, it excluded thousands of lesserknown labels that bricks-and-mortar retailers may
not have carried, and that consumers may not have
known. In addition, to the extent that individuals
had heterogeneous and strongly-held preferences,
consumers who sought to purchase these wines may
have been significantly worse off if they settled for
less-preferred substitutes. 57
While it is clear that economically speaking, direct shipment
bans have a negative impact on consumer choice and the
development of niche markets, the question of their
constitutionality remains unanswered. The Supreme Court began
to broach the question in Granholm v. Heald.
5.

Granholm v. Heald 58

The Supreme Court held in two consolidated cases that it is a
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause "to allow in-state
wineries to sell wine directly to consumers in that State but to
prohibit out-of-state wineries from doing so, or, at least, to make
direct sales impractical from an economic standpoint.,,59 The
Court invalidated New York and Michigan laws restricting out-ofstate direct wine sales. 6o Both Michigan's and New York's
regulatory schemes imposed three-tiered distribution systems
requiring separate licenses for producers, wholesalers, and
retailers. 61 The Court reaffirmed the principle that three-tiered
distribution schemes are constitutional under the Twenty-first
Amendment. 62 However, Michigan's and New York's three-tiered
systems were applicable only to out-of-state wineries; in-state
wineries were able to obtain direct-sale licenses. 63 The Court
noted that the "discrimination substantially limits the direct sale of

56.
57.
58.
59.

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 22.
544 U.S. 460 (2005).
/d. at 465-66.
Id.
Id. at 466.
/d.
/d. at 467.

278

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 36

wine to consumers, an otherwise emerging and significant
·
,,64
b usmess.
The plaintiffs in the suits represented small wineries unable to
fulfill requests from consumers in Michigan and New York due to
the states' bans on direct sales. 65 In order to ship to consumers in
these states, the wineries were required to find a wholesaler to
complete the "direct" sales; however, the wholesaler's markup
would "render shipment . . . economically infeasible.,,66 In
Michigan, out-of-state wineries may purchase a $300 "outside
seller of wine" license while a small in-state winery may purchase
a "wine maker" license for $25. 67
The Court has long maintained that laws burdening out-of-state
economic interests and benefiting in-state economic interests
violate the Commerce Clause. 68 "State laws that discriminate
against interstate commerce face 'a virtually per se rule of
invalidity. ,,,69
Michigan and New York argued that their laws were permitted
under the Webb-Kenyon Act. 7o The Court rejected this reading of
the Webb-Kenyon Act, arguing that the Act cannot be construed as
"removing any barrier to discriminatory state liquor regulations" or
favoring discrimination of out-of-state liquors. 71
Michigan and New York further argued that Section 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment grants the states "the authority to
discriminate against out-of-state goods."n The Court disagreed,
holding that the cited history provides support for the argument
that Section 2 "restored to the states the powers they had under the
[pre-Prohibition] Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts.,,73 The Court
opined that the goal of the Twenty-first Amendment was to give
the states a framework to control liquor "by regulating its
transportation, importation, and use,,,74 but it does not permit the
states. to discriminate against out-of-state products by giving

64.
65.
66.

67.
68.

69.

70.
71.

72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 468.
See id.
/d. at 469.
Id. at 472 (citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99
(1994)).
/d. at 476 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,624 (1978)).
See id at 481-83; see supra Part I1(B)(1).
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 462. "The Webb-Kenyon Act readily can be construed as
forbidding 'shipment or transportation' only where it runs afoul of the State's
generally applicable laws governing receipt, possession, sale, or use." Id. at 482
(citing McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 286 U.S. 131, 141 (1932)).
Id. at 484.
Id.; see infra Part II(B)(I).
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484.
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preference to their own, contrary to the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 75
Michigan and New York argued that the regulations advance
legitimate state purposes that cannot be served without
nondiscriminatory means: first, prevention of minors from
obtaining alcohol and second, "facilitating tax collection.,,76 The
Court relied on a FTC study stating that the purchase of wine over
the Internet by minors is not a problem. 77 In addition, the Court
believed states could impose less restrictive preventative measures
such as requiring an adult signature upon delivery. 78
The Court did recognize that permitting direct shipping carries
However, the Court pointed to
the risk of tax evasion. 79
Michigan's "licensing and self-reporting" regulations utilized
within the three-tiered system and reasoned that those schemes
would also suffice for direct shipments. 80 The Court concluded
that Michigan's and New York's stated legislative goals cannot
adequately justify a need for discrimination consistent with the
Twenty-first Amendment or the Commerce Clause. 81
To properly understand the evolution of the Dormant
Commerce Clause-Twenty-first Amendment interplay, it is
necessary to examine how alcohol regulations came to exist on the
federal level, beginning with pre-Prohibition legislation.

B.

History of Federal Alcohol Regulation
"If God forbade drinking, would He have made
wine so good?"
-Cardinal Richeleu 82

1.

Wilson Act and Webb-Kenyon Act

Prior to the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment and the
prohibition of all alcoholic beverages, the temperance movement
sought to reduce sales of alcoholic beverages through a state by
state approach. 83
"[M]any states passed laws restricting or
75.
76.
77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id. at 486.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 490. Some argue that minors would prefer beer or liquor to wine and a
"quick fix" in lieu of waiting several days for a shipment. Further, teenagers
generally consume cheaper wines, not higher priced boutique wines. Federal
Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 12.
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490-91.
Id. at 491.
Id.
Id. at 493.
The Wrath of Grapes, Quotable Quotes, supra note 21.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476.
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prohibiting the sale of alcohol. ,,84 The Supreme Court was
amenable to upholding laws restricting sales and production, but
unwilling to uphold laws related to imports. 85
The Court invalidated a number of such state liquor laws based
on the Commerce Clause and "advanced two distinct principles.,,86
First, states were not permitted to discriminate against imported
liquor under the Dormant Commerce Clause. 87 Second, states
could not constitutionally pass "facially neutral laws that placed an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce.,,88
Prior to
Prohibition, states struggled to regulate the importation,
transportation, and manufacture of liquor, while Congress, under
its Commerce Clause powers, attempted to maintain control over
the issue. 89 Following a series of cases invalidating state laws,
Congress passed the Wilson Act,90 which enabled the states to
regulate out-of-state liquor "to the same extent and in the same
manner" as liquor produced in-state. 91 The Court's reading of the
Wilson Act affirmed the line of cases "striking down state laws
that discriminated against liquor produced out of state.,,92 The text
of the Wilson Act reads as follows:
All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating
liquors or liquids transported into any State or
Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption,
sale, or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such
State or Territory be subject to the operation and
effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted
in the exercise of its police powers, to the same
extent and in the same manner as though such
liquids or liquors had been produced in such State
or Territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by
reason of being introduced therein in original
packages or otherwise. 93
84.
85.
86.
87.

88.

89.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476-77 (citing Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 91 (1897);
Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446,461 (1886); Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123,
126 (1880». The Dormant Commerce Clause is "[t]he constitutional principle
that the Commerce Clause prevents state regulation of interstate commercial
activity even when Congress has not acted under its Commerce Clause power to
regulate that activity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 285 (8th ed. 2004).
Id. at 477 (citing Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412,414-16 (1898); Vance v. W.A.
Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 444 (1898); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 10809 (1890); Bowan v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 486-87 (1888».
Id. at 476-78.
27 U.S.c. § 121 (2000).
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 478 (quoting 27 U.S.c. § 121).
Id. at 483.
27 U.S.C. § 121.
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The Court, interpreting the Wilson Act, determined that states were
permitted to regulate the resale of imported liquor, leaving
consumers the ability to receive direct shipment of liquors for
personal use. 94 Thus, liquor sales by mail order flourished. 95
In response, Congress enacted the Webb-Kenyon Act. 96 The text
of the Act provides:
The shipment or transportation . . . of any
spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other
intoxicating liquor of any kind from one State . . .
into any other State . . . which said spirituous,
vinous, malted, fermented, or other intoxicating
liquor is intended, by any person interested therein,
to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner
used, either in the original package or otherwise, in
violation of any law of such State . . . is
prohibited. 97
The constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act under the
Commerce Clause was called into question but a divided Court
upheld the law. 98 The Court determined that the Webb-Kenyon
Act permitted states to forbid direct shipments of liquor to
consumers so lon~ as the states treated in-state and out-of-state
products similarly. 9
The Court interpreted the Webb-Kenyon Act as extending that
which was intended under the Wilson Act-specifically, to
eliminate the "regulatory advantage" of immunity under the
Commerce Clause granted to imported liquor under Bowman and
Rhodes. 100
In 1919, the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment prohibited
all liquor and rendered all legal questions regarding the WebbKenyon Act moot; however, Prohibition ended fourteen years later
with the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment. 101

94.

See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 480 (citing Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412,421-26
(1898)).

95.

[d.
27 U.S.c. § 122 (2000); see Granholm, 544 U.S. at 481.
27 U.S.c. § 122.
See Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 325-32 (1917).
/d. at 321-22.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 482 (citing Clark Distilling, 242 U.S. at 324).
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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Twenty-first Amendment, Section 2
"For when the wine is in, the wit is out .... "
-Thomas Becon, The Catechism 375 102

The speedy and unprecedented ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment served two primary purposes: it repealed prohibition
under the Eighteenth Amendment and gave states the power to
control interstate transportation and importation of intoxicating
liquors. 103 The corresponding wording of the latter provision is
contained in Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment: "The
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited." 104 However, this clause applied literally appears to
conflict with the Dormant Commerce Clause, thus raising the
question, which clause controls?
The legislative intent behind the Twenty-first Amendment has
been intensely debated since its enactment, especially because of
its complex relationship with the Dormant Commerce Clause. 105
Some legal scholars argue that Section 2 provided the states full
control over liquor, unrestricted "by other constitutional provisions
or the earlier nondiscrimination principle in the Wilson Act;" other
scholars argue that Section 2 merely granted states the same
powers they had prior to Prohibition. 106 Cases decided soon after
Congress passed the Twenty-first Amendment interpreted the
Amendment as giving states absolute authority over liquor control,
favoring the Twenty-first Amendment over other constitutional
provisions. 107
However, modem Twenty-first Amendment
jurisprudence has rejected this approach and instead utilizes a
theory that balances the Twenty-first Amendment with other
constitutional provisions, including the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 108
102.
103.
104.
105.

106.
107.

108.

The Wrath of Grapes, Quotable Quotes, supra note 21.
Lucas, supra note II, at 901.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
See, e.g., Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673,678 (S.D. Tex. 2002), ajJ'd,
336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).
Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
See, e.g., State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62
(1936); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n of Mich., 305 U.S.
391, 394 (1939) (referring to the "substantive power of the State to prevent the
sale of intoxicating liquor").
See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 486-87 (2005) (noting that "[t]he Court
has applied this rule in the context of the First Amendment . . . ; the
Establishment Clause ... ; the Equal Protection Clause ... ; the Due Process
Clause, ... ; and the Import-Export Clause ...."). See also 44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (First Amendment); Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (Establishment Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
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In recent years, court opinions on the issue run the gamut,
depending on:
(1) [W]hether the judge interprets the
amendment as providing nearly absolute plenary
power to the states under § 2 of the twenty-first
amendment . . . or (2) whether the judge applies
more recent Supreme Court developments in
dormant commerce clause analysis and balancing
tests and gives prominence to economic
discrimination resulting from a state's disparate
application of its regulatory scheme to favor local
pro ducers .... 109
For example, in 1986, the Supreme Court stated, "the Twenty-first
Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of alcohol
from the reach of the Commerce Clause."llo The Court's most
recent iteration of the interplay between the Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment is detailed in the
landmark case of Granholm v. Heald:
The aim of the Twenty-First Amendment was to
allow States to maintain an effective and uniform
system for controlling liquor by regulating the
transportation, importation, and use.
The
Amendment did not give States the authority to pass
nonuniform laws in order to discriminate against
out-of-state goods, a privilege they had not enjoyed
at any earlier time. III
In Granholm, the Court determined that a "State which chooses
to ban the sale ... of alcohol altogether could bar its importation;
and . . . it would have to do so to make its laws effective . . . .
State policies are protected under the Twenty-first Amendment
when they treat liquor produced out of state the same as its
domestic equivalent." I 12

109.
110.
Ill.
112.

190 (1976) (Equal Protection Clause); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971) (Due Process Clause); Dep't of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co.,
377 U.S. 341 (1964) (Import-Export Clause).
Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 678-79.
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 584
(1986).
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484-85.
Id. at 488-89.
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Maryland Makes Wine?
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Maryland's wine industry began in the 1600s, when Governor
Charles Calvert planted 200 acres of European grapes on the east
bank of the St. Mary's river. 113 In 1984, the Maryland wineries
formed the Maryland Wineries Association and with it, the first
Maryland Wine Festival. 114 The Association launched its first
cooperative marketing campaign in 2001, and, in 2004, Governor
Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr. formed the Maryland Wine and Grape
Advisory Committee to investigate growth in the industry. I IS
Currently, there are twenty wineries operating in Maryland. 116
Two thousand and four was a record-breaking year for the
industry-sales were estimated at over $7 million, a 22.5 percent
increase from 2003. 117
. 2.

Maryland Law Grants Benefits to Maryland Wineries

Maryland law bans direct shipments from producers to
consumers and applies to both out-of-state and in-state wineries. I IS
While Maryland wineries may not ship wines directly to resident
consumers, state law, until recently, permitted local wineries to sell
and deliver wine directly to individuals and retailers outside of the
wholesale scheme. 119 In-state wineries were eligible for licenses
that permitted them to sell their wines directly to licensed retail
wine dealers, including restaurants. 120 Out-of-state wineries were
not eligible for these licenses; instead, they were forced to
113.
114.
115.
116.

The Maryland Wineries, History of Maryland Wine, http://www.marylandwine.
comlmwalleammore/history.shtml (last visited Mar. 24,2007).
Id.
Id.
The Maryland Wineries, Maryland Wine Industry Statistics, http://www.maryland
wine.comlmwalleammore/stats.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2007).

117.

Id.

118.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 16-506.1 (2005). The law provides:
A person in the business of selling or distributing alcoholic
beverages in or from another state may not ship, cause to be shipped,
or deliver alcoholic beverages directly to a recipient in this State if
the seller, distributor, shipper, transporter, or recipient does not hold
the requisite license of permit under this article . . .. [This
prohibition] ... includes alcoholic beverages that are ordered or
purchased through a computer network. . .. A person who violates
this section is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to a fine
not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 2 years or both.
!d.
See Complaint at 14, Bushnell v. Ehrlich, 2005 WL 3673790 (D. Md. Nov. 18,
2005).
!d. at 15. See also MD. CODE REGS. 03.02.01.03 (2006); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B,
§§ 1-201,7-101,12-107,16-506.1.

119.
120.
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negotiate the wholesale system to sell their products in
Maryland. 121
3.

Bushnell v. Ehrlich's Threat to Maryland Law 122

Following the Granholm decision, a Pennsylvania vintner in
Bushnell v. Ehrlich challenged Maryland's regulations alleging
that the State gives preferential and unconstitutional treatment to
local wineries by permitting them to sell their wines directly to
restaurants and retailers. 123 Recognizing the viability of this claim,
the Maryland Comptroller attempted to preserve Maryland law.
He reinterpreted the statute that gave local wineries the ability to
sell their wines to local restaurants and retailers. By nulling the
statute, the Comptroller forced local wineries, in sixty days, to find
wholesalers to sell their wines. 124 Under advice of the Maryland
Attorney General's Office, the Comptroller believed that
reinterpreting the regulation was the only option to prevent
Maryland's anti-direct shipment laws from being struck down on
Dormant Commerce Clause grounds. 125 The unfortunate result of
this action was an uncertain future for Maryland wineries, most of
whom produce too little wine to attract wholesaler interest. 126
The Maryland Legislature could have responded to the Bushnell
threat in three possible ways: First, legislators might have repealed
the benefits to local wineries so that out-of-state wineries were on
par; second, legislators could have altered the three-tiered system
to permit direct shipping for both in-state and out-of-state wineries;
third, legislators may have continued to disallow direct shipment
but permit in-state and out-of-state wineries to deal directly with
retailers and restaurateurs. 127
Responding to public outcry in defense of Maryland's wineries,
the Maryland Legislature struck a last minute compromise with
then Governor Ehrlich and the competing industries. 128 The new
legislation permits "wineries that produce less than 27 ,500 ~allons
annually" to apply "for a limited wholesaler's license.,,12 The
wholesaler's license permits these smaller wineries to sell directly
to retailers and restaurants. 130 By permitting smaller wineries to
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See Complaint, supra note 119, at 16. See also MD. CODE REGS. 03.02.01.03
(2006); MD. CODE ANN. art. 2B, § § 1-20 I, 7-10 I, 12-107, 16-506.1.
Complaint, supra note 119.
!d. at 14-16.
Dresser, supra note 13, at 6A.
!d.
[d. at IA.
[d.
Andrew Green, Wine Bill Compromise Struck, BALT. SUN, Apr. 7,2006, at 5B.
[d. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 2-201 (Supp. 2006).
Green, supra note 128. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 2-201.
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act as their own wholesalers, state officials sidestepped litigation
that would likely have forced Maryland to permit direct shipment.
III. ANAL YSIS
"Wine is bottled poetry."
-Robert Louis Stevenson 131

To date, no Supreme Court case has directly addressed the
constitutionality of direct shipment laws in general. I32 However,
the Court did determine in Granholm that New York and
Michigan's direct shipping regulations, treating in-state and out-ofstate shippers differently, violate the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 133 This Comment posits that under modem Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, direct shipping laws are
unconstitutional-specifically, Maryland's direct shipping laws are
unconstitutional.
A.

Commerce Clause Analysis

The Supreme Court in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New
York State Liquor Authority articulated a two-tiered approach to
analyze state economic interests under the Commerce Clause. 134
The Court explained that if a state statute facially
regulates or discriminates against interstate
commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state
economic interests over out-of-state interests, we
have generally struck down the statute without
further inquiry .... When, however, a statute only
has indirect effects on interstate commerce and
regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether
the State's interest is legitimate and whether the
burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the
local benefits. 135
The Court has consistently held that strict scrutiny must be applied
when examining Dormant Commerce Clause cases.136 Thus, when
its direct shipping regulations are challenged, a state must prove
that its laws are "closely related to its powers reserved by the
twenty-first amendment and that the statutes promote core
concerns of that amendment." 137
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

The Wrath of Grapes, Quotable Quotes, supra note 21.
Molnar, supra note 37, at 178.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005).
476 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986).
Id. at 579.
Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673,682 n.16 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
/d.
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Core Concerns of the Twenty-first Amendment

Bacchus v. Dias directs us to weigh the core concerns of the
Twenty-first Amendment against policies that seemingly violate
the Dormant Commerce Clause. 138 However, the core concerns of
the Twenty-first Amendment's drafters are controverted.
Legal scholars have debated the issue but have not formed a
solid conclusion. Duncan Baird Douglass conducted a detailed
review of the legislative history of the Twenty-first Amendment,
utilizing "comments of various senators during the ratification
debates to support three different interpretations of § 2:" First, the
provision did not exempt states from any part of the Constitution
and returned authority to regulate liquors to the states; second, that
states wanting to remain dry after the Eighteenth Amendment was
repealed would have the authority to do so; or third, the
Amendment exemRted state liquor regulation from Commerce
Clause limitations. 39
After reviewing the debates, Douglass concluded:
The Twenty-first Amendment garnered the
requisite two-thirds vote ... probably because most
members of Congress saw section one, the simple
repeal of constitutional Prohibition, as the bulk of
the Amendment's purpose and substance. It seems
that sections two and three of the Amendment were
seen as being primarily procedural sections,
necessary to support and implement section one ...
. [S]ubstantive debate ... focused principally on
two subjects: whether the text should explicitly
prohibit saloons and the means of ratifying the
Amendment. The meaning of ... section two . . .
was subjected to limited scrutiny. 140
Douglass concluded "[t]he plain meaning of the text and the
legislative history, taken together, do not reveal a single, correct
interpretation of the effect the Amendment ha[ s] on state authority

138.

139.

140.

Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). "State laws that constitute mere
economic protectionism are therefore not entitled to the same deference as laws
enacted to combat the perceived evils of unrestricted traffic in liquor." Id. at 276.
Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 681 (citing Duncan Baird Douglass, Note,
Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-First Amendment and the
Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of Interstate Commerce in
Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1628-36 (2000».
Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the
Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation
of Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1631-32
(2000).
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Thus, the varying approaches that district court judges
have taken range from an expansive analysis to a more narrow
approach. 142
.,,141

Without a clear historical approach, the Supreme Court has
determined that the core concerns of the Twenty-first Amendment
include "promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market
conditions, and raising revenue .... ,,143 It is important to note that
economic protectionism is not a core concern of the Twenty-first
Amendment; "[t]he central purpose of the provision was not to
empower states to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers
to competition."I44 Further, "[s]tate laws that constitute mere
economic protectionism are therefore not entitled to the same
deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an
unrestricted traffic in liquor." 145
The proper recourse, then, is to first apply traditional Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis. 146 If the law does not pass strict
scrutiny under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the court must
determine whether the state has demonstrated that there are no
reasonable nondiscriminatory means of advancing the Twenty-first
Amendment's core concerns. 147

C. Applying Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis to Maryland's
Direct Shipment Laws
"The wines that one best remembers are not
necessarily the finest that one has ever tasted, and
the highest quality may fail to delight so much as
some far more humble beverage drunk in more
favorable surroundings."
-H. Warner Allen 148

Unlike the statutes at issue in Granholm, Maryland's direct
shipment laws treat in-state and out-of-state wineries similarlyneither are permitted to ship wine directly to Maryland consumers;
the regulations at issue are thus facially neutra1. 149 Until April
141.
142.

143.
144.
145.

146.
147.

148.
149.

Id. at 1636.
Compare Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673 (ruling Texas ban on direct shipment
from out-of-state suppliers was unconstitutional), with Bridenbaugh v. FreemanWilson, 227 F.3d 848 (2000) (holding Indiana ban on direct shipment from outof-state suppliers was authorized by the Twenty-first Amendment).
North Dakota v. U.S., 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990).
Bacchus Imp. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
Id.
Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 524 (6th Cir. 2003), affd by Granholm v. Heald,
544 U.S. 460 (2005).
Engler, 342 F.3d 517.
The Wrath of Grapes, Quotable Quotes, supra note 21.
See supra text accompanying note 118.
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2006, Maryland law permitted local wineries to circumvent the
wholesale system, granting local wineries unconstitutional
preferential treatment over out-of-state wineries. ISO Under the
Brown-Forman analysis, these regulations do not pass
constitutional scrutiny. lSI
The intended result of the Bushnell litigation-legalizing direct
shipment-was not achieved. Instead, Maryland residents may see
a slight increase in the availability of wines produced by very
small wineries in local liquor stores. IS2 The April 2006
compromise permits small vintners to serve as their own
wholesalers, but does not permit direct shipment to consumers. IS3
Moreover, the regulations only permit out-of-state wineries
producing 27,500 gallons of wine per year to sell to retailers. 154
Wineries producing more than 27,500 gallons per year must attract
wholesaler attention to carry their product. Initially, wine industry
advocates proposed a 250,000 gallon limit but the wholesale lobby
resisted, settling on the 27,500 gallon compromise. 155 Wholesale
industry advocates also rejected a 40,000 gallon proposal.IS 6 The
27,500 gallon compromise is a contrived measure designed to
permit only the smallest wineries entry to the Maryland market,
enabling the legislature to avoid the direct shipment issue
altogether.
Instead of permitting Bushnell litigation to proceed, the
Maryland Legislature paid lip service to the out-of-state wine
industry by placing a legislative band-aid on the direct shipment
issue. This Comment posits that under Brown-Forman analysis,IS7
any legislative result short of permitting direct shipment for both
in-state and out-of-state wineries is unconstitutional.
Under the first half of the Brown-Forman analysis, Maryland's
facially neutral direct shipping laws pass Dormant Commerce
Clause strict scrutiny.IS8 However, Brown-Forman next mandates
that "when ... a statute ... has only indirect effects on interstate
commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we ... [examine] whether

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
ISS.
156.

157.
158.

See Complaint, supra note 119, at 14-28.
See supra text accompanying notes 134-135.
See David Dishneau, Small Wineries Raise a Glass, WASH. TIMES, July 31, 2006,
at CI4.
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 2-201(v)(1)-(3) (Supp. 2006).
/d.
Dishneau, supra note 152, at CIS.
Julekha Dash, Compromise Will Allow Md. 's Wine Makers to Continue Selling to
Restaurants, WASH. Bus. J., AprilS, 2006, available at http://phoenix.hizjournals
.comlwashingtonlstories/2006/04/03/daily I 7.html.
See supra text accompanying notes 134-135.
See supra text accompanying notes 134-135.
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the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on
interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits." 159
Maryland's anti-direct shipment law, while facially neutral, has
a prejudicial effect on out-of-state wineries and thus constitutes
functional discrimination. This Comment will further examine the
benefits that local wineries enjoy.
1.

Market for Maryland Wines

The local market for Maryland wines is booming; in 2004, sales
were estimated at over $7 million, a 22.5 percent increase from
2003. 160 The Mazland Wineries Association's "Ask for Maryland
Wine" campaign I I and Maryland laws permitting local vintners to
circumvent the three-tiered system have enabled Maryland retailers
and restaurants to carry Maryland wines. 162 One local wholesaler
and one multi-national wholesaler carry four Maryland wines. 163
The Maryland Wineries Association hosts six annual wine festivals
serving Maryland wines exclusively.l64 Currently, there are
twenty Maryland wineries located across the state. 165 In short,
Maryland consumers have numerous options when purchasing
local wines. Consumers may attend a wine festival, visit a local
winery, or even purchase local wines in their neighborhood liquor
store, enabled by Maryland laws permitting manufacturers to
circumvent the wholesale system to sell to restaurants, retailers,
and consumers.
Further, while Maryland wineries may not ship products
directly to in-state consumers, they may ship directly to consumers
living in states that permit direct shipment of wines. 166 The
Maryland Wineries Association is unaware of any Maryland
wineries that currently ship out-of-state. 167 If Maryland's direct

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

164.
165.
166.
167.

Supra text accompanying notes 134-135.
See The Maryland Wineries, Maryland Wine Industry Statistics, supra note 116.
See Maryland Wineries Association, http://marylandwine.com (last visited Mar.
24,2007).
See Complaint, supra note 119.
E-mail from Kevin Atticks, Executive Director, Maryland Wineries Association
to Lauren Dunnock, University of Baltimore School of Law Student and
University of Baltimore Law Review Production Editor, (March 10, 2006,
21 :27:00 EST) (on file with author).
Maryland Wineries Association, 2007 Wine Festivals, http://www.marylandwine.
cornlmwalevents/festivals.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2007).
Maryland Wineries Association, 2007 Wine Festivals, http://www.marylandwine.
cornlmwalevents/festivals.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2007).
See Md. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 2-205(a)(3)(i) (2002 & Supp. 2006).
E-mail from Kevin Atticks, supra note 163.
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shipping laws were amended to permit direct shippin on a
reciprocal basis, sales by direct shipments would increase. I 618
2.

Wholesaler Market's Prejudicial Effect on Out-of-state Small
Wineries

Maryland consumers wishing to purchase a moderately priced
Oregon Pinot Noir listed in Wine Enthusiast's Top 100 Wines have
two choices-search for the wine in their local liquor store, where
a Maryland wholesaler mayor may not distribute the wine, or
board a plane to Portland.
"The value of the direct sale of wine is estimated at $500
million with some estimates as high as $1 billion." 169 Small outof-state wineries rely on direct shipping to sell their products
because production is too small for wholesalers to carry their
wines, while many consumers rely on the Internet to purchase
wines unavailable in their local liquor store. 170 While in some
circumstances wine may be considered a substitute good, it is not
for many consumers.
Compare the following scenario:
a
consumer on her way to a party stops at her local liquor store for a
bottle of wine-any bottle will do (substitute), versus a wine
enthusiast intrigued by Robert Parker's online rave review of a
California Syrah who will be content only with this California
Syrah. For the latter consumer, no other Syrah will do (not a
substitute). In this situation, Maryland's direct shipment laws
harm the consumer and the out-of-state retailer. The laws restrict
competition, inflate prices, and decrease consumer access to goods,
which are not carried by the wholesaler.
The out-of-state winery, unlike the Maryland winery, is
effectively shut out of the Maryland market unless the winery is
small enough to qualify for Maryland's limited wholesaler permit.
The Maryland winery is advantaged by location and legislative
benefit. 171 Thus, Maryland's direct shipment laws constitute
functional discrimination and are unconstitutional under the
Dormant Commerce Clause unless the State may demonstrate that
there are no reasonable nondiscriminatory means of advancing the
Twenty-first Amendment's core concerns. 172

168.
169.
170.

171.
172.

Thirteen states pennit direct shipment only if the state of origin also penn its
direct shipment. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 7.
Molnar, supra note 37, at 173.
Jd. at 184-85.
See Complaint, supra note 119, at 14-16.
See Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 524 (6th CiT. 2003).
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D. Do Maryland's Laws Satisfy the Twenty-first Amendment's
Core Concerns?
Violations of the Dormant Commerce Clause pass
constitutional scrutiny if justified by a core concern of the TwentyCore concerns include "promoting
first Amendment. 173
temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising
revenue.,,174 This Comment will base assumptions of the State's
arguments on those used by other states in legal challenges.
1.

Promoting Temperance

While perhaps a legitimate concern in the nineteenth century, it
is clear that promoting temperance is no longer a primary objective
of legislators in this State. While promotion of temperance
remains a cited goal in Maryland's statement of policy regarding
liquor laws,175 several of the State's licensing schemes contradict
this statement. The State issues permits to sell beer, wine, and
liquor across the State. 176 Permits may be obtained for sales of
beer, wine, or liquor at wine festivals,177 golf courses, 178
racetracks,179 and beer festivals. 18o Further, Maryland wineries
have been permitted to bypass the wholesaler system to sell
directly to restaurants and retailers since 1951. 181 Considering the
widespread means in place to sell and purchase alcohol, it does not
follow that promotion of temperance is a legitimate goal of
Maryland's anti-direct shipment laws.
2.

Collection of Taxes

Taxation on liquor sales is a significant source of revenue for
the State. 182 "Increased direct shipping . . . brings with it the
potential for tax evasion.,,183 In Granholm, Michigan and New
York state officials cited fear of tax evasion as a primary reason for
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See, e.g., North Dakota v. U.S., 495 U.S. 423 (1990) .
Id. at 432.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 1-101 (2005).
Id. at §§ 3-101, 3-201, 3-301, 6-101, 6-201.
Id. at §§ 8-301 to -314.
Id. at §§ 8-501 to -507.
Id. at §§ 8-601 to -603.
Id. at §§ 8-801 to -805.
See Ted Rouse, Decision on Wineries Hurts Economy, Environment, BALT. SUN,
Feb. 26, 2006, at 17A.
U.S. Census Bureau, State and Local Government Finances by Level of
182.
Government and by State, 2001-2002, http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate
/022Imdsl_l.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2007). General revenue for state and
. local government totaled $32,318,019 in fiscal year 2001-2002. Of that total,
taxes on alcoholic beverages equaled $25,754 and liquor store revenue equaled
$162,437. /d.
183.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 469, 491 (2005).
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not permitting direct shipments from out-of-state. 184 New York
required permits for in-state wineries to ship to consumers.18S The
Supreme Court noted "[i]f licensing and self-reporting provide
adequate safeguards for wine distributed through the three-tiered
system, there is no reason to believe they will not suffice for direct
shipments." 186 For example, "licensee~ could be required to
submit regular sales reports and to remit taxes." 187
The Court noted several provisions of federal law that ~rovide
incentives for compliance with state tax collection regimes. 88 For
example, if a winery violates state law, the Federal Tax and Trade
Bureau has the authority to revoke the winery's federal license,
thus preventing the winery from operating in any state. 189 In
addition, the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act granted
state attorney generals the authority to sue wineries in federal court
for violating state direct shipment laws. 19o The Court stated that
these federal tools, combined with state licenses, "adequately
protect States from lost tax revenue." 191
The FTC's report on wine and barriers to e-commerce observed
that several states permitting direct shipments of wine 192 have tax
collection mechanisms in place and report "few, if any,
problems." 193 One such state, New Hampshire, outlined its
procedures when a shipper is discovered violating the state's tax
collection laws: "When the N.H. Liquor Commission discovers an
improper shipment we contact the company and inform them of the
laws in [New Hampshire]. Once the company learns of [New
Hampshire] laws they normally get a permit or stop shipping in
[New Hampshire]." 194
184.

[d. at 463.

185.

[d.at491.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

[d.

192.

One such state is Louisiana:
[W]ine may be sold and shipped directly to a consumer in Louisiana .
. . , provided both that all taxes levied in R.S. 26:341(B) have been
paid in full and that all of the following apply: ... Any manufacturer
. . . of winer,] engaging in the direct shipment of such beverages
under the provisions of Subsection B of this Section shall make an
annual application to the secretary of the Department of Revenue for
authority to make such shipments and shall pay the annual tax of one
hundred fifty dollars levied by R.S. 26:341 (B)(2) prior to selling or
shipping any sparkling wine or still wine into the state of Louisiana.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26:359 (2001 & Supp. 2006).
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 4.
/d. at 38.

193.
194.

[d.
[d. at 492.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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Furthermore, in all likelihood many out-of-state wine shippers
would voluntarily comply with state tax requirements. 195 For
example, the Wine Institute, a winery trade association, "indicated
that 'wineries will embrace any kind of scheme that would require
the payment of taxation if [they] can simply get access to the
markets. '" 196
Finally, there is evidence that some out-of-state shippers
illegally ship wine to states that do not allow direct shipment. 197
These shippers are already breaking the law. It is unlikely that
creating a tax collection regulation will increase the amount of
illegal shipment; rather, it seems that states would increase tax
collection by permitting business from honest retailers that already
abide by the law. 198
Tax collection, while a legitimate purpose under the Twentyfirst Amendment, could be easily facilitated through nondiscriminatory means. It is a farcical reason to disallow direct
shipment under Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
3.

Preventing Sales to Minors

In Granholm, Michigan and New York argue that prevention of
alcohol sales to minors is a legitimate reason for denial of direct
shipment. 199 The Supreme Court cites as evidence the FTC's
report that the twenty-six states currently permitting direct
shipment "report no problems with minors' increased access to
wine. ,,200 The Court lists several reasons why this is not
surprising: "First, minors are less likely to consume wine, as
opposed to beer, wine coolers, and hard liquor. Second, minors
who decide to disobey the law have more direct means of doing so.
Third, direct shipping is an imperfect avenue of obtaining alcohol
for minors who ... 'want instant gratification. ",201 In Granholm,
Michigan and New York were unable to provide concrete evidence
that direct shipment would increase sales to minors. In short,
preventing sales to minors does not justify the regulation in the
face of Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.202

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

201.
202.

Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460,489 (2005).
Id. at 490 (citing Federal Trade Commission, Possible Anti-Competitive Barriers
to E-Commerce: Wine 34 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.
pdf).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
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Furthermore, "the Model Direct Shipping Bill developed by the
National Conference of State Legislatures requires an adult
signature on delivery .... ,,203 FedEx's delivery policy demands
several requirements for shipping wine: First, all packages must
have an "Adult Signature" sticker; second, recipients must show
identification proving they are at least twenty-one years of age; and
finally, signature releases are not permitted, nor are indirect
deliveries (deliveries made to a location other than the recipient's
address). 204
The Court noted that wineries not in compliance with state law
restricting sales to minors face loss of federal and state licenses,
providing a strong incentive not to sell to minors. 205 States can
take less restrictive steps to ensure that minors may not purchase
Thus, in
wine than banning direct shipment altogether. 206
Maryland too, prevention of sales to minors is not a legitimate
reason to discriminate against out-of-state wineries.
E.

Protectionism

Without additional evidence that Maryland's direct shipping
laws are intended to promote the core concerns of the Twenty-first
Amendment, it appears that they are rather intended as
protectionist policies to aid local winemaking industries at the
expense of consumer choice, free trade, and the benefits that
accompany trade, such as lower prices. This conclusion is further
substantiated by the existence of Maryland laws that benefit local
wineries. 207 Permitting the smallest out-of-state wineries to sell
directly to retailers does not negate the effects of protectionist
policies or solve the problem. Statutes that permit Maryland
wineries to directly sell their products to retailers and restaurants
clearly benefit development of the local wine industry. While this
is a noble goal, regulations cannot promote the interests of in-state
sellers while unfairly inhibiting the interests of out-of-state
wineries. 208 Those that do, constitute economic ~rotectionism and
are forbidden by the Dormant Commerce Clause. 09

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

209.

Id.
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 36-37.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490.
Id. at 490-91.
See Complaint, supra note 119.
See Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984). "State laws that constitute
mere economic protectionism are therefore not entitled to the same deference as
laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor." Id.
Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
If Maryland enacted anti-direct shipping regulations for other
consumer goods, those regulations would be struck down as an
unconstitutional violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 210
Boutique wine is a product with enormous industry potential; it
should be treated similarly to other consumer goods. The reasons
cited by the Supreme Court in justifying discriminatory or
protectionist policies under the Twenty-first Amendmentpromotion of temperance, tax collection, and preventing sales to
minors-are not substantial enough to justify the discriminatory
impact that anti-direct shipping laws have on out-of-state wineries
and consumers alike. 2l1
The regulations harm local wineries, out-of-state wineries, and
interfere with consumer choice, enabled by the monopolistic
interests and political clout of wholesalers and retailers. Courts
shaping decisions in these cases should consider the interests of the
consumer and those of free trade and weigh these interests against
those of the wholesalers and distributors.
In reforming Maryland policy, legislators should craft sound
regulations that advance the interests of local Maryland wineries
while opening the market to both out-of-state wineries and local
consumers. Maryland should shape its policy based on that of
states that currently permit direct shipment, such as Louisiana and
New Hampshire. 212 These states provide a statutory framework
that permits direct shipping while effectuating simple tax
collection mechanisms and providing penalties for sellers that do
not have adequate safeguards for preventing sales to minors.213
Catering to and working within a system created in an era of
mobsters and teetotalers is simply not sound policy for the twentyfirst century.
Supreme Court jurisprudence directs states to demonstrate that
policies discriminating against interstate commerce must be struck
down unless the state's interest is legitimate and the local benefit
outweighs the harm to interstate commerce. 214 State laws that
constitute mere economic protectionism are not saved by the
Twenty-first Amendment. 21 Maryland's standard tax collection
and temperance justifications should not override laws that
interfere with interstate commerce. Such a policy merely protects
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Molnar, supra note 37, at 173.
See supra Part III(D).
See supra note 33.
See supra Part III(D).
See supra Part III(A).
See supra Part III(B).
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the wholesale and retail industry to the detriment of Maryland
consumers, local wineries, out-of-state wineries, and the wine
industry. Thus, courts should apply the Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis posited in Granholm and this Comment and
conclude that anti-direct shipment laws are unconstitutional.
Lauren Dunnock

